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Introduction 
Based on a synthesised corporate governance theoretical framework, i.e. agency and resource 
dependence theory, this study provides a longitudinal international analysis – spanning five 
ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) – of the extent 
and determinants of tunnelling. The term tunnelling relates to efforts of controlling 
shareholders of parent firms to exploit minority shareholders by siphoning off firm’s 
economic resources (Johnson et al. 2000). Tunnelling is particularly serious in emerging 
economies due to poor corporate governance systems that fail to protect minority 
shareholders and corporate ownership structures that promote expropriation opportunistic 
behaviour (e.g. Aharony et al. 2010; Bae et al. 2002; Bai et al. 2004; Bertrand et al. 2002; 
Claessens et al. 2000; Friedman et al. 2003; Liu & Lu 2007). Many researchers (e.g. 
Claessens et al. 2000; Gao & Kling 2008; La Porta et al. 1999; Liu & Lu 2007) claim that the 
Asian tunnelling problem is assisted by weak corporate governance systems and concentrated 
ownership structures. For instance, they argue that unrestrained tunnelling was the main 
reason precipitating the 1997–1999 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). 
Though various methods of tunnelling have been suggested, much of the empirical 
research focuses on RPTs 3. Weak corporate governance systems and prevailing corporate 
structures in many nations worldwide, provide a great scope for RPTs to be a convenient 
mechanism for the expropriation of firm value from minority shareholders (Cheung et al. 
2006; Cheung et al 2009; Gao & Kling 2008; Liu & Lu 2007) There is a view that RPTs are a 
high risk factor for investors (Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis 2006; Cheung et al. 2009; Kohlbeck 
& Mayhew 2010). Abusive RPTs have increasingly become a challenge to the integrity of the 
Asian capital market (OECD 2009). 
An overwhelming theme of prior empirical tunnelling research is the varying 
influence of corporate governance, whether at the national or firm-level. In the present 
globalised BE, ‘corporate governance’ is a frequently used catch-phrase sometimes used as 
an all-encompassing concept but at other times cast in a very narrow frame of reference. 
Though there has been much corporate governance debate in recent decades, the underlying 
concept is not well understood with a lack of consensus on a formal definition and conceptual 
boundaries. At a national-level, legal systems and investor protection are merely components 
of a broader system. Meanwhile, ownership structure is also a single facet of a broader range 
of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms. Further adding to the complexity of the 
issue is that within the concept of ownership structure, alternative structural combinations 
(e.g. levels of foreign, family or governmental ownership) can impact on ownership structure 
as an effective corporate governance mechanism. The complexity of corporate governance 
raises a number of unanswered and interesting questions in relation to tunnelling. Two are of 
prime interest to this study. These are: (1) Does the broader national-level corporate 
governance system influence the extent of tunnelling? (2) Do different ownership types (that 
constitute a firm’s general ownership structure) influence the extent of tunnelling? This study  
addresses these issues in the context of Southeast Asia countries. 
                                                          
3 RPTs do not always have negative consequences. Studies ( Cheung et al. 2009; Khanna & Palepu 1997; Kim 
2004) argue that certain group structures and RPTs among member firms help to reduce transaction costs and 
overcome difficulties in enforcing property rights and contracts essential for production. Indeed, firms may 
make strategic investments in joint ventures to obtain and secure access to supplies and markets, and to manage 
risk. Transactions between the firm and related parties also generally involve less information asymmetry 
compared with transactions between a firm and a third party (Kohlbeck & Mayhew 2010). Djankov et al. (2008) 
note nations around the world do not completely ban RPTs, thereby, supporting the notion RPTs can be value 
enhancing. 
 
Juliarto et al. | Managerial Ownership Influencing Tunnelling Behaviour 
 
27 
 
This study utilises OLS regression in its main analysis by using 200 firm-year 
observations data of listed firms from five ASEAN countries. Findings show evidence of a 
positive association between managerial ownership and tunnelling via RPTs. The other 
important findings are that BE, foreign ownership, and independent directors are not effective 
in mitigatng tunnelling behaviour. Moreover, countries’ legal systems and firm size clearly 
influence the extent of tunnelling. This paper offers insights via cross country study of 
tunnelling behaviour by ASEAN listed firms over the GFC period.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the 
related literature and develops the hypotheses. The third section outlines the research 
approach of the study with discussion of results in fourth section. The paper concludes with 
key implications. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
Previous Studies on Tunnelling 
 
Prior empirical research of RPT tunnelling has mostly been country specific, with many 
recent studies focusing on firms listed in the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) (e.g. Cheung 
et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009; Guo 2008; Jian & Wong 2003; Jiang et al. 2010; Li 2010; Liu 
& Lu 2007). The PRC has been of major interest due to their unique institutional and 
corporate structures, and the detailed RPTs their firms are required to report (Aharony et al. 
2010). In the PRC, the majority of firms are carve-outs (or spin-offs) from state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and often continue to share personnel functions, capital, and assets with 
the parent entity (Liu & Lu 2007; Ge et al. 2010). Consequently, it is alleged corporate 
management of the PRC firms often take action benefitting the largest shareholders (i.e. 
government). 
Empirical research using the PRC firms generally highlight the existence of tunnelling 
(Jian & Wong 2003). Liu and Lu (2004) conclude that earnings management amongst the 
PRC firms is primarily induced by controlling shareholders tunnelling resources. Cheung et 
al. (2005) find minority shareholders in firm conducting RPTs with SOEs are left 
significantly worse off than counterparts in non-SOEs. Aharony et al. (2010) note PRC 
issuers are likely to use operational tunnelling to opportunistically manage earnings upward 
in the pre-initial public offering (IPO) period, and that pre-IPO period operational tunnelling 
is motivated in part by the prospect of opportunistic tunnelling in the post-IPO period. 
Outside of the PRC, there is generally a paucity of empirical research of tunnelling in 
other national contexts. Nonetheless, evidence suggests tunnelling transcends international 
boundaries. Evidence of resource expropriation to benefit majority shareholders (i.e. 
tunnelling) is found in nation-specific studies of firms in Bulgaria (Atanasov 2005), Hong 
Kong (Cheung et al. 2006), India (Bertrand et al. 2002), Japan (Weinstein & Yafeh 1998), 
Russia (Atanasov et al. 2006), South Korea (Bae et al. 2002; Baek et al. 2006), Sweden 
(Bergstrom & Rydqvist 1990) and the United States (Atanasov et al. 2006). Whilst the 
dominant view is that tunnelling is relatively widespread, empirical evidence of tunnelling is 
not universal.  Chang and Shin (2007), for example, see  no clear evidence of tunnelling 
amongst a sample of South Korean conglomerates (i.e. chaebols). 
To date the overwhelming focus of empirical research is focused on detecting 
tunnelling, with few studies formally examining possible determinants. Of the international 
tunnelling studies conducted to date (Friedman et al. 2003; Glaeser et al. 2001; Johnson et al. 
2000), it is commonly argued legal system differences and variations in investor protection 
are key determinants of tunnelling. Johnson et al.’s (2000) study of European tunnelling cases 
state that “potential differences between civil and common law countries in how courts 
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approach tunnelling cases” (Johnson et al, 2000, p26) affected actions to expropriate 
resources from minority shareholders. Friedman et al. (2003) find “strong empirical evidence 
that entrepreneurs tunnel resources out of firms in countries with weak investor 
protection”(Friedman et al. 2003, p748). 
At a firm level, the overwhelming focus is on ownership structure spanning variations 
of the majority ownership versus minority ownership theme; i.e.: (a) pyramid group structure, 
(b) large block holder versus minority shareholders, or (c) family-owned block versus non-
family minority shareholders. Bertrand et al. (2002), for example, provide evidence of 
tunnelling in Indian business groups whereby cash flows from firms lower in the pyramid to 
higher level firms where the controlling groups have greater ownership rights. Gao and Kling 
(2008), meanwhile, find cash flows with the entity is higher where the founding family 
continues to maintain controlling interest.   
Four predictive variables are explored in this study as possible influencing factors of 
tunnelling activities. The first is national corporate governance (BE) and the remaining three 
are various aspects of key ownership structures (family, managerial and foreign). 
    
Business Environment (BE) and RPTs Tunnelling 
 
The national-level corporate governance system is an important focus of this study. A 
nation’s BE is considered to be fundamental in determining the national-level corporate 
governance system. These systems in turn impact on tunnelling behaviour. 
To better determine the impact of a national-level corporate governance system on 
tunnelling, a synthesised framework of the four major theoretical perspectives of corporate 
governance is utilised. The four major theories are: agency theory, resource dependence 
theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory (Udayasankar et al. 2007). The first two 
theories aid in establishing a nation’s competitive BE whilst the latter two underpin the 
regulatory business environment (RBE). The BE is a product of its competitive and 
regulatory environments. 
The rawest, and most basic, objective of a firm is to develop a sustainable competitive 
advantage and remain a viable going-concern. Agency theory holds an implicit number of 
assumptions. One important assumption postulated suggests inefficient firms (i.e. firms with 
high levels of agency costs) face threats from competitors in the BE through the advent of the 
market for corporate control (Jensen and Ruback 1983). Agency theory presumes an efficient 
and competitive business environment (CBE) prevails where asymmetrical information is 
minimal and competitive pressures high. In contrast to agency theory, resource dependence 
theory focuses on human resource capabilities of actors within the corporate governance 
structure and the resulting impact on firm performance. Resource dependence theory argues a 
firm can benefit strategically from board capital that ultimately implies an organisation is 
efficient. The general proposition upheld by resource dependence advocates is that firms 
benefit from human capital (i.e. skills and strengths of the directors); this presumes the 
presence of a reasonably efficient labour market (e.g. Dalton et al. 1999; Hillman & Dalziel 
2003). Similarly, relational capital, such as channels of communication, is likely to enhance 
firm value in cases when the channels of communication offer a firm a competitive edge over 
competitors. Overall, assumptions inherent in agency and resource dependence theories are 
best achieved in a BE highlighting principles of perfect competition (Udayasankar et al. 
2005). Competitive dynamics researchers argue motivation and capability are two prime 
drivers of a firm’s competitiveness and efficiency (e.g. Gimeno 1999; He & Mahoney 2006). 
That is, agency theory assists to explain how corporate governance influence the motivation 
of corporate management to select optimal decisions in the distribution and use of free cash 
flows that enhances shareholder wealth, whereas resource dependence theory stresses the 
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capability of a firm’s corporate governance to enhance the undertaking of key strategic 
competitive actions. 
 For the RBE, arguably stakeholder theory and institutional theory are most relevant. 
Stakeholder theory advocates (Donaldson & Preston 1995; Hillman & Keim 2001; Roberts 
1992) argue that even in the most expansive form of social responsibility, corporate 
management sees stakeholder management as having a positive contribution toward firm 
value (Owen & Scherer 1993). 
Institutional theory suggests firm value is best derived by the firm being in 
consonance with its institutional environment (e.g. Arthur 2003; Hart & Milstein 2003; 
Oliver 1997). These arguments have found support with prior empirical research (e.g. Lee & 
Pennings 2002; Thornton 2002) that suggest institutional pressures influence a firm’s value. 
Advocates of institutional theory (in the same vein as supporters of stakeholder theory) stress 
the importance of regulation within the BE. Researchers have identified various institutional 
pressures that influence the regulatory aspects of the BE such as the legal system (e.g. La 
Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2002), trade agreements (e.g. Levy & Prakash 2003), social co-
operatives and state ownership (Shleifer & Vishny 1997).  Other empirical evidence of the 
impact of institutional factors is widespread. Wurgler (2000), meanwhile, finds strong 
institutional structures prevent overinvestment in declining, unproductive industries and 
firms. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) show institutional actors can prevent negative 
financial accounting practices such as earnings management. 
 Impromptu corporate governance mechanisms evolve out of competitive pressures 
between firms and an incentive for a firm to differentiate itself from competitors  
(Chakrabarti 2008). On this basis, the CBE is closely associated with corporate governance 
practices and standards; and, therefore, agency theory and resource dependence theory 
(Udayasankar & Das 2007). In a strong and efficient CBE, firms will be under pressure to 
conform to business-derived corporate governance norms and standards. Furthermore, firms 
have an incentive to regularly update and develop alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms so they can be differentiated from competitors. A firm failing to conform with 
corporate governance practices and standards in a strong and efficient CBE is likely to be 
punished (e.g. loss of value) by investors and providers of key resources (e.g. labour, material 
suppliers). In a weak and inefficient CBE the fear of being punished by investors and key 
resource providers will be diminished (La Porta et al. 1998, 1999). Consequently, firms have 
little incentive to conform and develop new corporate governance practices and standards. 
Overall, a strong and efficient CBE is likely to provide firms less scope and opportunities to 
tunnel resources away from minority shareholders via RPTs. As regulatory efficiency (a key 
assumption of institutional and stakeholder theories of corporate governance) increases, 
various coercive forces will pressure firms to develop corporate governance mechanisms that 
conform to practices and standards legislated and enforced by the nation’s regulatory 
framework, and that benefit organisational legitimacy and effect (Udayasankar & Das 2007). 
In a highly efficient RBE, therefore, a firm is likely to have less scope and incentive to adopt 
practices and conventions (such as those expropriating resources from minority shareholders) 
for fear it will draw unwanted regulatory and political attention. Given strong CBE and RBE 
will diminish opportunities for RPTs tunnelling, it is hypothesised: 
 
H1: There is a negative association between the strength of a nation’s BE and the 
extent of tunnelling via RPTs. 
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Ownership Structure 
 
This section outlines prior research considering the influence of three key ownership structure 
features (i.e. family, managerial and foreign) on accounting issues. Based on this review 
testable hypotheses addressing the association with tunnelling via RPTs are formed.  
Various ownership patterns exist across economies. Dispersed shareholdings 
supported by a well-functioning legal and regulatory framework have provided an efficient 
base for capital accumulation (La Porta et al. 1999; Shleifer & Vishny 1997;). A recent 
stream of literature brings into question the assumption of diffused ownership and suggests in 
many economies that concentrated ownership is more typical (Anderson & Reeb 2003; 
Claessens et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999). In East Asia, concentrated ownership in the 
form of family ownership dominates other types of ownership (Claessens et al. 2000). Family 
ownership has an informal powerful influence on the way that organisation are run, with 
positive and negative outcome (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino 2003). Family control may reduce 
agency cost by helping to align ownership with control ( Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). On the other hand, family control may increase the likelihood of 
expropriation of non-family minority shareholders and can harm performance (Bloom & Van 
Reenen 2006). A concentrated pattern of ownership potentially allows insiders to have tighter 
control over the firm, however it also creates opportunities to expropriate wealth from other 
shareholders (Faccio, Lang & Young 2001; Villalonga & Amit 2006). A more common 
occurrence, a family controlled entity, uses a variety of means to transfer a significant 
proportion of free cash flows from a company in which they have small cash flow rights into 
a company in which they have large cash flow rights and control (Johnson et al. 2000). 
Controlling shareholders could transfer wealth, or get special benefits, by self-dealing 
transactions between the controlling shareholders and the controlled firms (Gilson & Gordon 
2003). 
Guo (2008) reveals that the presence of controlling shareholders and higher control 
rights leads to higher levels of tunnelling via RPTs. In a similar spirit, Li (2010) investigates 
tunnelling by controlling shareholders in China’s public firms, and finds that tunnelling is 
pervasive and severe. Given that many listed firms characterised by family controlling 
shareholders are common in Southeast Asia, this study assumes that the higher percentage of 
family ownership, the higher the tunnelling threats. Accordingly, these arguments lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a positive association between a firm’s family ownership and the extent  
of tunnelling via RPTs. 
 
Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) document that higher CEO stock ownership helps 
alleviate some of the agency problems that arise in corporation by aligning the interest of 
manager and shareholders.  As long as managers are minority shareholders, their ownership 
role might also mitigate the danger of tunnelling (Gao & Kling 2008; Liu & Lu 2007). On the 
other hand, Klein (2002) finds a positive correlation between CEO shareholdings and 
earnings management, which is consistent with recent events and accounting scandals. If the 
CEO manages earnings to increase  their overall compensation, then there will be a positive 
relation between CEO shareholdings and earnings management (Klein 2002). This indirectly 
indicates the possibility of expropriation. Morck, Shleifer & Vishny(1988) suggest that high 
shareholding by top managements may cause moral hazard and information asymmetry 
problems between the inside (management and directors) and outside investors. In a similar 
vein, Santiago-Castro and Brown (2011) find a positive association between CEO ownership 
and the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights. Thus, managerial 
Juliarto et al. | Managerial Ownership Influencing Tunnelling Behaviour 
 
31 
 
shareholdings appear to lower the level of monitoring that may negatively affect minority 
shareholders, without the presence of other internal corporate governance mechanisms. Their 
finding supports the agency theory argument that when managers’ shareholdings grow as a 
fraction of personal wealth, their interest becomes more aligned with the majority shareholder 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976; Weisbach 1988). As manager shareholdings increase, their 
objectives more closely match those of the controlling shareholder, and consequently 
minority shareholders may lose an important monitoring device for good corporate 
governance. Gibson (2003) also suggests that minority investors in emerging markets 
controlled by a large shareholder, i.e. family, should be aware that managers may favour the 
large shareholder at the expense of the minority shareholders. This discussion leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: There is a positive association between a firm’s managerial ownership and the 
extent of tunnelling via RPTs. 
 
Foreign ownership can be seen as one effective mechanism that can complement the 
current governance structure in order to monitor the management from non-value maximising 
activities (Dahlquist & Robertsson 2001). Foreign investors may also have better monitoring 
capabilities, which can help firms to move away from an over-reliance on concentrated 
ownership (Khanna & Palepu 2000). Djankov and Murrell (2002) find in their extensive 
survey of the research on transition economies that when investment funds, foreigners, and 
other outsiders become influential owners, ten times as much restructuring takes place in 
former SOEs. 
Young et al. (2008) suggest the important role of foreign ownership such as foreign 
institutional investors in institutional reform. They further state that as emerging economies 
become more open, this exposure to outside ideas and influence will likely accelerate 
governance reforms. Foreign institutional investors are outside the domestic social networks 
from which the institutional norms of behaviour are generated, and they are therefore more 
likely to push for transparent deals and pressure governments to improve minority 
shareholder protection (Peng 2003). In other words, they may be more pressure-resistant to 
locally-generated principal-principal problems (Kochhar & David 1996; Tihanyi et al. 2003). 
Demands for transparency imply reducing asymmetry information and consequently, prevent 
opportunistic behaviour. Similarly, increased protection of minority shareholders by 
governments creates a pressure for firms to act in ways not detrimental to minority 
shareholders. This study expects that the higher foreign ownership can improve firm 
monitoring function against opportunistic behaviour including tunnelling. Hence:  
H4: There is a negative association between a firm’s foreign ownership and the extent  
of tunnelling via RPTs. 
In summary, four corporate governance mechanisms (BE, family ownership, 
managerial ownership, and foreign ownership) are hypothesised as possible predictors of 
tunnelling via RPTs. 
 
Research Approach 
 
This study uses a sample of publicly traded firms listed on the stock exchange in five ASEAN 
countries from 2006-20094. The total data set is 200 firm-year observations. Ten firms are 
randomly chosen in each country and observed over four years. The selected ASEAN 
countries sample are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines. These five 
                                                          
4 Financial firms are excluded from the sample since they are under a different regulatory regime. 
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countries are picked because they all have established stock exchanges with sufficient 
English language information including full comprehensive annual reports.  Moreover, these 
ASEAN countries are the chosen focus because they traditionally have weaker corporate 
governance systems but higher ownership concentration resulting in higher problems with 
tunnelling and expropriation by majority owners (Claessens & Fan 2002; Claessens et al. 
2000; Gao & Kling 2008;Haw et al. 2004; Liu & Lu 2007; Peng, Wei & Yang, 2011). 
By way of determinants of tunnelling, this study focuses on examining the influence 
of the national corporate governance business system and the firm-level ownership structure. 
In respect to the national corporate governance system, this study concentrates on BE and 
competitive and regulatory structures. As for firm-level ownership structure, the study 
considers three features: (a) family ownership; (b) managerial ownership; and (c) foreign 
ownership levels.  All RPTs data as well as ownership data and other financial data are 
gathered from firm financial statements and annual reports. Those data are collected from the 
ORBIS database and stock exchange websites in each sample country.  
To analyse the extent of tunnelling, this study uses RPTs as a proxy. Jian and Wong 
(2003) suggest that lending transactions to RPTs are commonly referred to as financial 
tunnelling. Jiang, Lee and Yue (2005) document robust evidence that ‘other receivables’ 
largely represent corporate loans extended to other firms (mainly the controlling 
shareholders) by the listed firm  and thus is a good measure of tunnelling. The ratio ‘other 
receivables to total assets’ is used as the measure of tunnelling by Jiang et al. (2005), Liu and 
Lu (2007), Li (2010) and Jiang, Lee and Yue(2010). Other researchers adopt the difference 
between other receivables and other payables divided by total assets as the measure of 
financial tunnelling (Guo 2008; Jian & Wong 2003). Meanwhile Gao and Kling (2008) 
measure the extent of tunnelling using as proxy the difference between accounts receivable 
and accounts payable divided by total assets. This research uses lending to related party 
divided by total assets (RPTLendTA) as the measure of tunnelling, which is consistent with 
Jiang et al. (2005), Liu and Lu (2007), Li (2010), and Jiang et al. (2010). Cheung et al. (2009) 
also suggest that direct cash payment and loan by listed firms to its controlling shareholder 
are clear examples of  tunnelling.  In addition, related parties’ loans are a useful example of 
this because they are traceable through public sources, and do not require a ‘fair value’ test, 
such as would be needed in other asset transfers between related parties. In terms of 
predictors of tunnelling, this study focuses on BE, family ownership (FAMOWN), 
managerial ownership (MANOWN) and foreign ownership (FOROWN). 
This study uses the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFWI) published by the 
Economic Freedom Network (EFN) as the primary data source for developing respective 
measures for the BE 5 . The EFWI measures the degree to which national policies and 
institutional influences within a nation are supportive of economic freedom and interaction 
(thereby defining the competitive and regulatory environments). An individual nation’s RBE 
is defined as the aggregate of LSI and GSI scores, whereas a CBE is a melding of the BRI 
and FTI scores. BE is an aggregation of RBE and CBE. For calculation purposes BRI, FTI, 
                                                          
5 The EFWI ranking of 130 nations is the result of a joint venture involving 71 national research institutions and 
foundations(Gwartney et al. 2006, p.3). The EFWI summary index is constructed from 42 data points that 
measure the degree of economic freedom in five major areas: (1) government size; (2) legal structure and 
security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to trade internationally; and (5) regulation of 
credit, labour and business. Four aspects of the EFWI (i.e. legal structure index (LSI), government size index 
(GSI), business regulation index (BRI) and freedom to trade internationally index (FTI)) are utilised to represent 
the four major theoretical threads underlying corporate governance. The four components selected reflect 
specific aspects of regulation and competitiveness that constitutes business environment (BE). Each component 
is normalised as a score ranging from zero to ten.  
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LSI and GSI score are equally weighted. Mathematically, the calculations of these scores for 
nation l are as follows: 
 
RBE_Scorel= [(∑LSIl,2004-2007)/(# Years)*0.5 + (∑GSIl,2004-2007)/(# Years)*0.5)]         [1] 
CBE Scorel= [(∑BRIl,2004-2007)/(# Years)*0.5 + (∑FTIl,2004-2007)/(# Years)*0.5)]              [2] 
BE Scorel = (RBE_Scorel + CBE_Scorel)*0.5                                                                   [3] 
 
The LSI6 score component of the EFWI is used as a proxy representing the influence 
of a nation’s institutional structure on the nation’s RBE.   Whereas, to gauge stakeholder 
strength that may precipitate a greater need to employ stakeholder management strategies, the 
GSI score from the EFWI is used as the relevant proxy7.  
The competitive component the BE score is an aggregate of BRI and FTI. The BRI 
measures the extent of regulations targeting businesses. BRI with higher scores imply 
business regulations are developed to encourage greater market freedom, efficiency and 
interaction between market participants. They enhance the ability of the market to solve 
principal-agent problems. This study uses the FTI score component of the EFWI as the proxy 
for the influence of resource dependence on the CBE. For interpretive purposes a nation with 
a higher FTI will enable firms operating in that nation to have a more efficient market for 
access key resources, thereby, prompting a stronger CBE. 
This study defines family ownership as an individual, or group of family members 
who hold more than 25% of firm’s voting rights and is the largest controlling block in the 
firm (Achmad et al. 2009; Claessens et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1999). Therefore, a firm has a 
family controlling shareholder if the sum of a shareholder’s direct and indirect voting right is 
more than 25%. An arbitrary value 25% of voting rights is used as this is usually enough to 
have effective control of a firm (Chernykh 2008; La Porta et al. 1999; OECD 2009). Family 
ownership (FAMOWN) is measured by using a dummy variable, one if a firm’s ultimate 
owner is family and zero otherwise.  
Managerial ownership (MANOWN) is measured by percentage of shares held by 
insiders, i.e. CEO and directors (Gao & Kling 2008; Jiang et al. 2010), whereas foreign 
ownership (FOROWN) is percentage of shares held by foreign investors both individual and 
institutional (Dahlquist & Robertsson 2001; Dow & McGuire 2009; Young et al. 2008).  Five 
control variables are also used in the model. Based on past studies, the control variables 
included are independent directors (IBD), legal origin (LO), size (LNSIZE), the debt ratio 
(DEBT), and year dummy variables (Cheung et al. 2009; Doupnik 2008; Gao and Kling 
2008; Guo 2008; Johnson et al. 2000; Leuz et al. 2003). The summary of the measurement of 
the variables is presented in Table 1. 
This research uses several statistical techniques for the data analysis. Descriptive 
statistics and univariate statistics including t-Test and ANOVA are employed to enhance the 
main analysis. Multiple regression analysis is used as the main statistical test of predictors of 
tunnelling. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 This approach follows prior work (e.g. La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2000) emphasising the importance of legal 
structure as a relevant barometer of the strength and influence of a nation’s institutional framework 
7 Governments, depending on size and strength, can assist in fostering growth of special interest groups whilst 
pursuing broader social agendas. A higher score of GSI indicates greater government involvement in the 
business environment suggesting heightened stakeholder strength and regulatory efficiency. 
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Table 1  
Variable Measurement 
Variables Measurement Type 
Dependent Variable 
RPTLendTA Loans to related party divided by total assets. Continuous 
Independent Variables 
Business Environment  (BE) BE Scorel = (RBE_Scorel + CBE_Scorel)*0.5 
Where: 
BE  : Business environment score. 
RBE : Regulatory business environment score. 
CBE : Competitive business environment score. 
 
Continuous 
Family Ownership 
(FAMOWN) 
This variable is measured by using a dummy variable, 
“1” if a firm ultimate owner is family and “0” otherwise 
(Achmad et al. 2009; La Porta et al. 1999).  
Categorical 
Managerial Ownership 
(MANOWN) 
Percentage of shares held by senior managers (board 
members and top management). 
Continuous 
Foreign Ownership 
(FOROWN) 
Percentage of shares held by foreign investors 
(individual and institutional). 
 
Continuous 
Control Variables 
Independent directors (IBD) The number of independent directors divided by total 
number of board directors. 
Continuous 
Legal Origin (LO) Equals “1” if a country follows civil law legal system, 
and “0” if a country follows common law legal system. 
Countries included in the civil law system are Indonesia 
and Philippines, whereas common law system are 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand (Doupnik 2008; La 
Porta et. al. 1999). 
Categorical 
Size (LNSIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets. Continuous 
Debt (DEBT) Total debts divided by total assets. Continuous 
Yeardum Year dummy variables: 
Yeardum1 : “1” if year 2006 and “0” otherwise. 
Yeardum2 : “1” if year 2007 and “0” otherwise. 
Yeardum3 : “1” if year 2008 and “0” otherwise. 
Yeardum4 : “1” if year 2009 and “0” otherwise. 
Categorical 
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Results 
 
Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics of dependent variables, explanatory variables 
and key firm financial data.  
Based on Table 2, listed companies have on average loan to related party (RPTLend) 
amounts are US$ 14.47 million with minimum value zero and maximum US$ 210 million. Of 
200 observations, 27 observations did not indicate loans to related party (RPTLend = 0). The 
loans to related party ratio is 3.44 % of total assets (RPTLendTA) on average. The maximum 
value is 98.10% and minimum value is 0%.  The average ratio is lower compared to 5.47 % 
average ratio of Chinese public companies (Li 2010). The BE score for five countries is 6.71 
on average which is a moderate level of maximum score at 10. The highest score of BE for 
five countries is 8.34 with minimum score 5.68. In regard to family ownership (FAMOWN), 
129 (64.5%) cases are categorised as family firm whereas the remaining 71 (35.5%) cases are 
considered as non-family firm. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics (N=200)a 
Variables Mean Median Stdev Min Max 
RPTLend 14,470,000 1,435,000  30,557,000 0    210,000,000 
RPTLendTA 0.0344 0.0033  0.1245 0.0000  0.9810 
BE 6.7120 6.6408 0.9017 5.6817 8.3358 
MANOWN 0.1552  0.0102  0.2387  0.0000  0.7815  
FOROWN 0.2331  0.1417  0.2459  0.0000  0.9378  
IBD 0.3849  0.3693  0.1430  0.1111  0.9000  
Total Assets 
 
1,508,763,989   862,817,591   1,960,058,153   824,236   11,077,000,000  
LNSIZE  20.1515   20.5757   1.7929   13.6222   23.1281  
Total Liabilities  749,415,930   337,592,492   1,034,197,197   293,331   5,814,269,000  
DEBT 0.4740  0.4864  0.2058  0.0348  0.9374  
Notes: Table 2 reports statistics descriptive of research variables and some key financial data.  
RPTLend =Loan to related parties; RPTLendTA= RPTLend divided by total assets; BE= Business environment; MANOWN= Managerial 
ownership; FOROWN=Foreign ownership; IBD=Independent board of director; LNSIZE= Natural logarithm of total assets; DEBT= total 
liabilities divided by total assets. 
RPTLend, Total assets, and Total liabilities are stated in US dollar. 
a
 Apart from continuous variables presented above, this study has three categorical variables consisting of family ownership, legal origin 
and year dummy. Distribution of family ownership (FAMOWN) comprises 129 (64.5%) family firms and 71 (35.5%) non-family firm; 
Legal origin (LO) composition is 80 (40%) cases from civil law countries whereas 120 (60%) cases come from common law countries. A 
balance panel of 50 firms each year is used over period 2006-2009 totaling 200 firm-year observations.  
Average managerial ownership of five countries is 15.52%, with maximum value at 
78.15%. The high percentage of MANOWN for certain firms reveal that top management is 
at times also the owner of firms. These conditions are not uncommon in Southeast Asia 
countries firms. Foreign ownership has a mean value at 23.31% and a maximum percentage 
of 93.78%.  
Sample firms have reported percentage of independent directors of between 11.11% 
and 90% with an average of 38.49%. This implies that most firms in these five Southeast 
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Asia countries have moderate levels of corporate governance practice in term of percentage 
of independent directors. Except for the Philippines, the other four countries require a 
minimum number of independent directors at one third of the total number of directors. The 
composition of the sample is 40% cases from civil law countries compared to 60% cases 
from common law countries. 
Total assets of 200 firms-years observations range from US$0.82 million to US$11.08 billion 
with US$1.51 billion on average. Those numbers show a high standard deviation of total 
assets among sample firm (US$1.96 billion). To overcome skewness total assets are 
transformed by natural logarithm. Table 2 also shows that the sample has average total 
liabilities at US$749.41 million with median at US$337.59 million and leverage (DEBT) 
ranging from 3.48% to 93.74% with 47.40% on average. 
Comparison of tunnelling activity (RPTLendTA) among the five countries and from 
year to year differences is provided in Table 3. ANOVA result shows there is a significantly 
different tunnelling (RPTLendTA) among the countries.  Average tunnelling (RPTLendTA) 
for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are 0.0303, 0.0049, 0.0955, 
0.0329, and 0.0085 respectively. Tunnelling (RPTLendTA) for the five countries is lower 
than one in PRC firms at 0.0547 (Li 2010). The country showing the highest tunnelling 
activity (RPTLendTA) is Philippines and the lowest one is Malaysia. Both countries have 
different legal systems with Philippines following civil law and Malaysia employing a 
common law system. In addition, Philippines has the second lowest BE score among the five 
countries after Indonesia. The tunnelling behaviour (RPTLendTA) from year to year does not 
demonstrate any statistically significant difference. In 2006 the ratio is 0.0430 and decreases 
to 0.0260 in 2007. The ratio increases to 0.0351 in 2008 and slightly decreases to 0.0335 in 
2009. There are similar practices over the entire study period. 
Table 4 shows Pearson correlation for all research variables.  Based on the literature 
review and hypothesis development, this study predicts a negative correlation between 
tunnelling activity (RPTLendTA) and BE. This study proposes a positive relationship 
between tunnelling (RPTLendTA) and family ownership (FAMOWN) and managerial 
ownership (MANOWN) whereas tunnelling activity (RPTLendTA) is predicted to have a 
negative correlation with foreign ownership (FOROWN). Correlation results show all 
directionalities are as predicted. From the table we do not find a strong correlation among 
independent variables (highest correlation is between family and managerial ownership at 
0.389). This implies that there is little chance of serious multicollinearity problems for the 
regression analysis.  
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Table 3 
ANOVA Tunnelling by Country and by Year 
 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 2006 2007 2008 2009 
RPTLend TA 
Mean 0.0303 0.0049 
0.0955 0.0329 0.0085 0.0430 0.0260 0.0351 0.0335 
N 40 40 40 40 40 50 50 50 50 
F 3.596 0.156 
p- value 0.007** 0.926 
Notes: Table 3 summarises ANOVA-test of RPTLendTA among five ASEAN countries over the period of 2006-2009 and ANOVA-test of RPTLendTA year by year. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 4 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
  RPTLendTA BE FAMOWN MANOWN FOROWN IBD LO LNSIZE DEBT Yeardum1 Yeardum2 Yeardum3 Yeardum4 
RPTLendTA 1             
BE -0.060 1            
FAMOWN 0.105 0.147** 1           
MANOWN 0.377*** 0.255*** 0.389*** 1          
FOROWN -0.072 -0.339*** -0.07 -0.167** 1         
IBD -0.092 0.416*** -0.006 -0.121 -0.017 1        
LO 0.187*** -0.732*** -0.290*** -0.252*** 0.271*** -0.295*** 1       
LNSIZE -0.480*** 0.137 -0.234*** -0.361*** 0.036 0.187*** -0.117 1      
DEBT -0.156** 0.030 -0.180** -0.279*** 0.014 0.046 0.054 0.300*** 1     
Yeardum1 0.040 0.000 -0.03 -0.009 0 -0.039 0 -0.078 -0.029 1    
Yeardum2 -0.039 0.000 -0.006 -0.014 0.027 -0.011 0 0.012 -0.04 -0.333*** 1   
Yeardum3 0.003 0.000 0.018 -0.007 0 -0.027 0 0.024 0.046 -0.333*** -0.333*** 1  
Yeardum4 -0.004 0.000 0.018 0.03 -0.027 0.077 0 0.042 0.024 -0.333*** -0.333*** -0.333*** 1 
Notes: Table 4 displays Pearson correlations of research variables. 
RPTLend =Loan to related parties; RPTLendTA= RPTLend divided by total assets; BE= Business environments; MANOWN= Managerial ownership; FOROWN=Foreign ownership; LO=Legal origin which 
equals one if civil law legal system and equals zero if common law legal system.D=Indpendent board of director; LNSIZE= Logarithm of total assets; DEBT= total liabilities divided by total assets; Yeardum1: 
equal one if year is 2006 and zero otherwise; Yeardum2: equal one if year is 2007 and zero otherwise; Yeardum3: equal one if year is 2008 and zero otherwise; Yeardum4: equal one if year is 2009 and zero 
otherwise. 
**, ***,  significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels (2-tailed) respectively. 
 
Juliarto et al. | Managerial Ownership Influencing Tunnelling Behaviour 
39 
 
Table 5 reports multiple regression analysis of the relationship among BE, ownership 
structure, control variables, and the extent of tunnelling via RPTs. The BE variable does not explain 
the extent of tunnelling. This study does not observe empirical evidence about the influence of 
family ownership on the extent of tunnelling.  
In line with expectations, the regression coefficient for managerial ownership is positive and 
statistically highly significant. This finding supports Hypothesis three that predicts a positive 
association between managerial ownership and tunnelling via RPTs. This finding suggests that the 
higher shareholding by managers increases the potential for the expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ rights. Finally, the other ownership variable, i.e. foreign ownership, has no 
statistically significant coefficient. Thus, Hypothesis four is rejected.  
Among the control variables, legal origin (LO) and firm size (LNSIZE), have statistically 
significant positive and negative signs respectively. This is consistent with previous studies that 
predict a positive relationship between civil law system and tunnelling. A growing body of research 
suggests that civil-law countries are less protective of minority shareholders than common-law 
countries (Doupnik 2008; Johnson et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1999). In regards to firm size 
(LNSIZE), this study finds that the lower the total assets, the higher potential of tunnelling. Given 
small firms are less likely to have ownership separated from control there could be more 
expropriation (Claessens et al. 2000). The three other control variables, i.e. independent boards of 
director (IBD), leverage (DEBT) and year dummy, do not help to explain the extent of tunnelling. 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Multiple Regression Resultsc 
 
Dependent Variable: RPTLendTA  
Predictors Coefficients t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 
0.361 2.776 0.006*** 
BE 0.015 1.091 0.277 
FAMOWN -0.006 -0.331 0.741 
MANOWN 0.163 4.256 0.000*** 
FOROWN -0.030 -0.939 0.349 
IBD 0.057 0.959 0.339 
LO 0.084 3.627 0.000*** 
LNSIZE -0.025 -5.272 0.000***d 
DEBT 0.007 0.177 0.860 
Yeardum1 0.010 0.460 0.646 
Yeardum3 0.009 0.451 0.652 
Yeardum4 0.005 0.236 0.814 
F Statistic                8.891      p-value 0.000*** 
R2                0.342 
Adjusted R2 0.304 
Notes: Table 5 reports OLS regression result for 200 firm-year observations. 
Dependent variable: RPTLendTA; Independent variables: BE, FAMOWN, MANOWN, FOROWN; Control variables: IBD, LO, LNSIZE, DEBT and 
Yeardum1-4. 
**, ***,  significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels. 
c  Similar results are also showed by stepwise regression method.  
 d t-test confirms that civil law countries 7.5% much higher RPTLendTA than common law countries 1.5% (p-value 0.047). 
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Implications and Conclusion 
 
This study extends empirical tunnelling research which looks at the national corporate governance 
level and firms’ ownership structures as determinants of tunnelling behaviour in ASEAN countries. 
As the proxy of tunnelling behaviour, loans to related party are employed in light of their potential 
ways of expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights. The findings of this study support the 
hypothesis concerning the positive link between level of managerial ownership and the extent of 
tunnelling.   
Hypothesis one regarding the association between BE and tunnelling is rejected. This 
finding is not consistent with the arguments that national corporate governance represented by the 
BE influences tunnelling behaviour. In regards to institutional theory, the weak institutional 
pressures experienced by most Southeast Asian countries may be responsible for this condition. 
Such countries generally have good statutory regulations but are weak in implementation and 
enforcement (OECD 2009).  Therefore, effective regulation is absent. From a stakeholder theory 
viewpoint, this finding posits ineffective government involvement in the BE.  This is a common 
phenomenon of governments in developing countries that struggle to properly manage their 
stakeholder expectations. Consequently, they may be disregarded when managing a BE. Moreover, 
competition forces do not necessarily create pressures for firms in this region to run efficiently. 
Perfect competition as an important assumption in agency and resource dependence theory is not 
fulfilled.  
Hypothesis two dealing with family ownership influence on tunnelling is rejected. This 
finding does not meet the expectation amid concerns that concentrated ownership in the form of 
family ownership dominates type of ownership in Southeast Asian firms. Such a condition 
potentially increases the opportunities of the controlling family to ‘tunnel’ out wealth from other 
shareholders (Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio et al. 2001; Villalonga & Amit 2006).  
Hypothesis three is supported. This finding gives empirical evidence that managerial 
ownership explains the extent of tunnelling via RPTs.  This result is in line with the agency theory 
argument that when managers’ shareholdings grow as a fraction of personal wealth, their interest 
becomes more aligned with the majority shareholder. This condition implies that minority 
shareholders may lose an important monitoring device for good corporate governance. 
Consequently, minority shareholders in the five sample countries should be wary of a high 
percentage of shareholdings by top management. The finding may also prompt regulators in these 
countries to evolve more effective measures and policies protecting the minority shareholders. 
This study fails to obtain empirical evidence that foreign ownership is a key governance 
mechanism against expropriation behaviour. The presence of many short term foreign investors 
(foreign portfolio investment) in emerging markets may partially explain the finding. Short term 
investors may only focus on profit taking actions. Such investors may pay less attention about long 
term sustainability of firms including potential threat of tunnelling behaviour. Emerging markets are 
not yet seen as part of 'normal' investor diversification strategy but rather as markets where higher 
risks (relative to developed markets) need to be offset by the possibility of above average gains as 
the main motivation for foreign investors to enter emerging markets of developing countries 
(WIDER 1990). Furthermore, it is often argued that foreign investors are at an informational 
disadvantage relative to local investors (Brennan & Cao 1997; Choe, Kho & Stulz 2005). 
Information asymmetries between foreign and local investors are particularly pronounced with 
respect to the evaluation of a firm’s governance structure and the scope for expropriation by 
controlling   insiders (Leuz, Lins & Warnock 2008). 
The findings also suggest that common law countries give better protection on minority 
shareholders’ rights than do civil law countries. Interestingly, the role of independent directors to 
restrain tunnelling behaviour is not supported by evidence in this study. Most firms in these five 
countries have satisfied the ‘minimum’ number of independent directors required by their domestic 
regulator. However, their conformity may be a formality. This study also documents that firm size 
as a control variable has a clear negative association with tunnelling.  This implies that small firms 
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are more susceptible to tunnelling. The final important finding is that there are no significant 
differences of the extent of tunnelling via RPTs prior, during and after the global financial crisis in 
these five key Southeast Asia countries. 
Given that many of the governance mechanisms proposed in this study, i.e. BE, foreign 
ownership, and independent directors, are empirically proven to be ineffective to curb RPT 
tunnelling, these findings should raise concerns for current good corporate governance 
prescriptions.  
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